Affichage des articles dont le libellé est US Army. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est US Army. Afficher tous les articles

dimanche 13 juin 2010

La guerre, douleur et mort





La guerre possède un visage que les romantiques n'aiment guère, celui de la douleur, de la mort. Le New York Times nous offre un superbe reportage dont voici quelques images avec un excellent article de C. J. CHIVERS


As Afghan Fighting Expands, U.S. Medics Plunge In


FRANTIC MOMENTS During a recent battle near Marja, an infantry patrol carried a wounded Marine to a medevac helicopter.



MARJA, Afghanistan — The Marine had been shot in the skull. He was up ahead, at the edge of a field, where the rest of his patrol was fighting. A Black Hawk medevac helicopter flew above treetops toward him, banked and hovered dangerously before landing nearby.

United Nations Could Hasten Removal of Taliban Leaders From Terror Blacklist (June 13, 2010)
U.S. Military Intelligence Puts Focus on Afghan Graft (June 13, 2010)
Several Marines carried the man aboard. His head was bandaged, his body limp. Sgt. Ian J. Bugh, the flight medic, began the rhythms of CPR as the helicopter lifted over gunfire and zigzagged away. Could this man be saved?

Nearly nine years into the Afghan war, with the number of troops here climbing toward 100,000, the pace for air crews that retrieve the wounded has become pitched.

In each month this year, more American troops in Afghanistan have been killed than in any of the same months of any previous year. Many of those fighting on the ground, facing ambushes and powerful hidden bombs, say that as the Obama administration’s military buildup pushes more troops into Taliban strongholds, the losses could soon rival those during the worst periods in Iraq.

Under NATO guidance, all seriously wounded troops are expected to arrive at a trauma center within 60 minutes of their unit’s calling for help. In Helmand Province, Afghanistan’s most dangerous ground, most of them do.

These results can make the job seem far simpler than it is. Last week, a Black Hawk on a medevac mission in the province was shot down by a rocket-propelled grenade, and four members of its crew were killed. And the experiences in May and early June of one Army air crew, from Company C, Sixth Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, showed the challenges of distance, sandstorms and Taliban fighters waiting near landing zones.

It also showed crews confronting sorrows as old as combat. In a guerrilla war that is turning more violent, young men in nameless places suffer wounds that, no matter a crew’s speed or skill, can quickly sap away life.

For Company C’s detachment in Helmand Province, the recent duty had been harried.

Over several days the crews had retrieved a Marine who had lost both legs and an arm to a bomb explosion; the medic had kept that man alive. They had picked up two Marines bitten by their unit’s bomb-sniffing dog. They landed for a corporal whose back had been injured in a vehicle accident.

And day after day they had scrambled to evacuate Afghans or Marines struck by bullets or blasted by bombs, including a mission that nearly took them to a landing zone where the Taliban had planted a second bomb, with hopes that an aircraft might land on it. The Marines had found the trap and directed the pilots to a safer spot.

Les infirmiers se ruent vers le blessé.


A few days before the Marine was shot in the skull, after sandstorms had grounded aircraft, another call had come in. A bomb had exploded beside a patrol along the Helmand River. Two Marines were wounded. One was dying.

For hours the airspace had been closed; supervisors deemed the conditions too dangerous to fly. The crews wanted to evacuate the Marines. “I’ll go,” said Sgt. Jason T. Norris, a crew chief. “I’ll walk.”

A crew was given permission to try. Ordinarily, medevac flights take off with an older, experienced pilot in command and a younger aviator as co-pilot. The two take turns on the controls.

From Kandahar, the brigade commander, Col. William K. Gayler, ordered a change. This flight demanded experience. Chief Warrant Officer Joseph N. Callaway, who had nearly 3,000 flight hours, would replace a younger pilot and fly with Chief Warrant Officer Deric G. Sempsrott, who had nearly 2,000 hours.

Afghan sandstorms take many forms. Some drift by in vertical sheets of dust. Others spiral into spinning towers of grit. Many lash along the ground, obscuring vision. Powdered sand accumulates like snow.

Le blessé a perdu beaucoup de sang mais est toujours conscient.

This storm had another form: an airborne layer of dirt from 100 to 4,000 feet above the ground. It left a low-elevation slot through which the pilots might try to fly.

The Black Hawk lifted off in dimming evening light. It flew at 130 knots 30 to 40 feet above the ground, so low it created a bizarre sensation, as if the helicopter were not an aircraft, but a deafening high-speed train.

Ten minutes out, the radio updated the crew. One of the Marines had died. The crew chief, Sgt. Grayson Colby, sagged. He reached for a body bag. Then he slipped on rubber gloves and sat upright. There was still a man to save.

Just before a hill beside the river, Mr. Callaway banked the Black Hawk right, then abruptly turned left and circled. The helicopter leaned hard over. He looked down. A smoke grenade’s red plume rose, marking the patrol.

The Black Hawk landed beside dunes. Sergeant Bugh and Sergeant Colby leapt out.

A corporal, Brett Sayre, had been hit in the face by the bomb’s blast wave and debris. He staggered forward, guided by other Marines.

Sergeant Bugh examined him inside the Black Hawk. Corporal Sayre’s eyes were packed with dirt. He was large and lean, a fit young man sitting upright, trying not to choke on blood clotting and flowing from his mouth.

United Nations Could Hasten Removal of Taliban Leaders From Terror Blacklist (June 13, 2010)
U.S. Military Intelligence Puts Focus on Afghan Graft (June 13, 2010)
The sergeant asked him to lie down. The corporal waved his arm.

“You’re a Marine,” the sergeant said. “Be strong. We’ll get you out of here.”

Corporal Sayre rested stiffly on his right side.

Sergeant Colby climbed aboard. He had helped escort the dead Marine to the other aircraft. The Black Hawk took off, weaving through the air 25 feet off the ground, accelerating into haze.

The corporal was calm as Sergeant Colby cut away his uniform, looking for more wounds. Sergeant Bugh suctioned blood from his mouth. He knew this man would live. But he looked into his dirtied eyes. “Can you see?” he asked.

“No,” the corporal said.

At the trauma center later, the corporal’s eyes reacted to light.

A Race to Treatment

Now the crew was in the air again, this time with the Marine shot in the skull. Sergeant Colby performed CPR. The man had no pulse.

Kneeling beside the man, encased in the roaring whine of the Black Hawk’s dual engines, the sergeants took turns at CPR. Mr. Sempsrott flew at 150 knots — as fast as the aircraft would go.

The helicopter came to a rolling landing at Camp Dwyer. Litter bearers ran the Marine inside.

The flight’s young co-pilot, First Lt. Matthew E. Stewart, loitered in the sudden quiet. He was calmly self-critical. It had been a nerve-racking landing zone, a high-speed approach to evacuate a dying man and a descent into a firefight. He said he had made a new pilot’s mistake.

He had not rolled the aircraft into a steep enough bank as he turned. Then the helicopter’s nose had pitched up. The aircraft had risen, climbing to more than 200 feet from 70 feet and almost floating above a gunfight, exposed.

Mr. Sempsrott had taken the controls and completed the landing. “I was going way too fast for my experience level,” the lieutenant said, humbly.

No one blamed him; this, the crew said, was how young pilots learned. And everyone involved understood the need to move quickly. It was necessary to evade ground fire and to improve a dying patient’s odds.

Beside the helicopter, inside a tent, doctors kept working on the Marine.

Sergeant Colby sat, red-eyed. He had seen the man’s wound. Soon, he knew, the Marine would be moved to the morgue. Morning had not yet come to the United States. In a few hours, the news would reach home.

“A family’s life has been completely changed,” the lieutenant said. “And they don’t even know it yet.”

Barreling Into a Firefight

A few days later, the crew was barreling into Marja again. Another Marine had been shot.

The pilots passed the landing zone, banked and looked down. An Afghan in uniform crawled though dirt. Marines huddled along a ditch. A firefight raged around the green smoke grenade.

The Black Hawk completed its turn, this time low to the ground, and descended. Gunfire could be heard all around. The casualty was not in sight.

“Where is he?” Mr. Sempsrott asked over the radio.

The sergeants dashed for the trees, where a Marine, Cpl. Zachary K. Kruger, was being tended to by his squad. He had been shot in the thigh, near his groin. He could not walk. The patrol had no stretcher.

A hundred yards separated the group from the aircraft, a sprint to be made across the open, on soft soil, under Taliban fire. Sergeant Bugh ran back. Sergeant Colby began firing his M-4 carbine toward the Taliban.

Inside the shuddering aircraft, the pilots tried to radiate calm. They were motionless, vulnerable, sitting upright in plain view.

The Taliban, they knew, had offered a bounty for destroyed American aircraft. Bullets cracked past. The pilots saw their medic return, grab a stretcher, run again for the trees.

They looked this way, then that. Their escort aircraft buzzed low-elevation circles around the zone, gunners leaning out. Bullets kept coming. “Taking fire from the east,” Mr. Sempsrott said.

These are the moments when time slows.

At the airfield, the crews had talked about what propelled them. Some of them mentioned a luxury: They did not wonder, as some soldiers do, if their efforts mattered, if this patrol or that meeting with Afghans or this convoy affected anything in a lasting way.

United Nations Could Hasten Removal of Taliban Leaders From Terror Blacklist (June 13, 2010)
U.S. Military Intelligence Puts Focus on Afghan Graft (June 13, 2010)
Their work could be measured, life by life. They spoke of the infantry, living without comforts in outposts, patrolling in the sweltering heat over ground spiced with hidden bombs and watched over by Afghans preparing complex ambushes. When the Marines called, the air crews said, they needed help.

Now the bullets whipped by.

A Hot Landing Zone

Cobra attack helicopters were en route. Mr. Sempsrott and Lieutenant Stewart had the option of taking off and circling back after the gunships arrived. It would mean leaving their crew on the ground, and delaying the patient’s ride, if only for minutes.

At the tents, Mr. Sempsrott had discussed the choices in a hot landing zone. The discussion ended like this: “I don’t leave people behind.”

More rounds snapped past. “Taking fire from the southeast,” he said.

He looked out. Four minutes, headed to five.

“This is ridiculous,” he said. It was exclamation, not complaint.

His crew broke from the tree line. The Marines and Sergeant Bugh were carrying Corporal Kruger, who craned his neck as they bounced across the field. They fell, found their feet, ran again, fell and reached the Black Hawk and shoved the stretcher in.

A Marine leaned through the open cargo door. He gripped the corporal in a fierce handshake. “We love you, buddy!” he shouted, ducked, and ran back toward the firefight.

Six and a half minutes after landing, the Black Hawk lifted, tilted forward and cleared the vegetation, gaining speed.

Le blessé est évacué alors que l'ennemi est toujours présent.



Corporal Kruger had questions as his blood pooled beneath him.

Where are we going? Camp Dwyer. How long to get there? Ten minutes.

Can I have some water? Sergeant Colby produced a bottle.

After leaving behind Marja, the aircraft climbed to 200 feet and flew level over the open desert, where Taliban fighters cannot hide. The bullet had caromed up and inside the corporal. He needed surgery.

The crew had reached him in time. As the Black Hawk touched down, he sensed he would live.

“Thank you, guys,” he shouted.

“Thank you,” he shouted, and the litter bearers ran him to the medical tent.

The pilots shut the Black Hawk down. Another crew rinsed away the blood. Before inspecting the aircraft for bullet holes, Sergeant Bugh and Sergeant Colby removed their helmets, slipped out of their body armor and gripped each other in a brief, silent hug.

dimanche 16 mai 2010

L’histoire du M16 de l’US Army

Fantassin américain tirant au M16 en conditions de combat.


Le fusil d’assaut américain M16 est entré dans la légende depuis son baptême du feu au Viêt-nam durant les années soixante. Près de cinquante ans après sa conception, il reste l’arme individuelle des GI’s.


Les origines du fusil d’assaut

Les Allemands ont été les concepteurs du fusil d’assaut moderne. Ils avaient analysé un grand nombre de combats d’infanterie et avaient découvert que, dans la grande majorité des engagements, les soldats échangeaient des tirs à une distance inférieure à 400 m. Pourtant leurs fusils avaient été conçus pour tirer avec précision sur des cibles se trouvant à plus de 1000 m.

Ces études de la Wehrmacht et les travaux des chercheurs de la firme Polte ont conduit à la mise au point d’une nouvelle munition pour arme d’infanterie tenant compte de la réalité des combats. La charge plus faible de poudre diminuait considérablement le recul et rendait possible un fonctionnement automatique. Le premier résultat concret de cette innovation apparut avec la mise en service du fusil d’assaut allemand Sturmgewehr 44 qui surclassait toutes les armes alliées.

Un collectionneur américain tire avec un StG44.

Le fusil d’assaut américain

Encombrés par des stocks gigantesques de fusils traditionnels Garand M14 pesant 5,1 kg et tirant une lourde cartouche de 7,62 mm, les Américains ne songeaient guère à adopter le fusil d’assaut qui équipait pourtant les armées du pacte de Varsovie.

Lorsque les Américains ont décidé de venir en aide au gouvernement du Sud Viêt-nam, ils se sont rendus vite compte que les Asiatiques n’avaient pas le gabarit pour mettre en œuvre le Garand M14. Il fallait trouver une arme plus légère. Ils la découvrirent dans leur propre pays où la firme Armalite avait mis au point au milieu des années cinquante l’AR-15, capable de tirer la nouvelle cartouche Fireball de 5,56 mm. Ce fusil destiné au marché civil avait vivement intéressé les Britanniques qui en avaient acheté 10 000 exemplaires.

Cette arme fonctionnait très classiquement par emprunt de gaz. Par un petit évent situé au-dessus du canon, une fraction des gaz de combustion propulsant la balle est récupérée et, au moyen d’un cylindre à gaz, agit directement sur la culasse. Celle-ci recule et comprime le ressort d’armement. Une fois la balle sortie du canon, le cylindre à gaz vidé, le ressort renvoie la culasse vers l’avant qui charge au passage une cartouche dans le canon et le cycle recommence.
Le tableau généalogique des fusils d'assaut modernes.


Premiers combats


Des AR15 furent envoyés à titre d’essai au Viêt-nam pour équiper les forces locales. Les conseillers américains sur le terrain ont été impressionnés par les performances de l’arme et ont vite adressé des rapports enthousiastes à Washington. L’US Army hésitait pourtant sur la conduite à tenir. Les essais officiels réalisés par l’armée ne laissaient eux non plus aucun doute, l’AR15 devait remplacer de toute urgence le Garand. Mais les bureaucrates du Pentagone hésitaient à remplacer tout l’approvisionnement en munitions. Ils finirent par s’incliner lorsque l’US Air Force prit l’initiative de s’équiper en AR-15 sous la désignation officielle de M16.

Au service de l’US Army

Avec l’engagement croissant des troupes américaines au Viêt-nam, les forces arrivant sur le théâtre d’opérations étaient dotées en priorité du M16.

Après les premiers combats, des rumeurs négatives ont commencé à circuler parmi les GI’s : l’arme s’arrêtait de fonctionner au beau milieu des combats !

Pour en avoir le cœur net, des enquêtes furent menées et révélèrent que l’arme s’encrassait au point de s’enrayer. Les critiques du M16 remontèrent jusqu’au Congrès qui réunit une commission pour faire la lumière sur cette affaire.

Les sénateurs voulaient comprendre pourquoi cette arme, réputée excellente, qui avait franchi avec succès toutes les épreuves de sélection de l’US Army, pouvait se révéler un pareil échec.

Le Sénat découvrit qu’une des deux raisons principales des difficultés de l’arme résidait, justement, dans sa réputation d’excellence. Parmi les soldats avait couru la rumeur que cette arme était si parfaite qu’elle ne nécessitait aucun entretien ! Ravis par cet encouragement à ne rien faire, les GI’s avaient abandonné la pratique traditionnelle de nettoyer et d’entretenir leur arme individuelle.

Seconde raison, une modification de la charge. Lors des premiers essais de l’US Army, les militaires avaient consommé des munitions civiles chargées à l’IMR (Improved Mili­tary Rifle), une poudre parfaitement connue, très stable et laissant peu de déchets. Or, en raison de l’incapacité des industriels à fournir cette poudre en quantité suffisante pour satisfaire les besoins militaires, les munitionnaires l’avaient remplacée par la ball powder, mise en point en 1954. Cette poudre non seulement laissait d’abondants résidus, mais elle accroissait indûment la cadence de tir et provoquait des ruptures de pièces.

Plus grave, au moment du tir, les résidus chauds formaient une sorte de glu qui se solidifiait à froid en immobilisant la culasse. On a vu des soldats qui, pendant les combats, étaient obligés de sortir la baguette de nettoyage pour désencrasser le tube de l’arme !

Pour remédier à ces inconvénients, des lubrifiants ont été distribués (la fameuse petite bouteille en plastique que les GI’s portaient sur le casque) et des cours d’entretien dispensés aux militaires. Le ressort du récupérateur fut changé afin de réduire la cadence de tir et la culasse fut dotée d’un levier d’armement afin de forcer si besoin une cartouche dans la chambre. Après ces modifications l’arme reçut en 1966 la désignation nouvelle de M16A1.

Des petits défauts qui persistent

Comme toutes les armes, le M16A1 possède d’indéniables qualités : légèreté, précision, cadence de tir, robustesse, etc. En revanche, on ne peut ignorer ses défauts comme un certain manque de puissance d’arrêt et une propension à s’enrayer dans les environnements sablonneux comme le Proche-Orient en dépit de l’adoption de la nouvelle cartouche SS109.

Le M16 a pris dans le monde occidental la place que l’AK 47 occupait dans le monde soviétique. Des millions d’exemplaires circulent de par le monde dans des versions très différentes comme celle de la mitrailleuse légère avec bipied et canon lourd au modèle avec canon raccourci pour les troupes aéroportées.